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WHY IS IT A CRIME TO STOMP ON A GOLDFISH? –
HARM, VICTIMHOOD AND THE STRUCTURE OF
ANTI-CRUELTY OFFENSES
INTRODUCTION
Animal cruelty is considered a crime in all fifty states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. 1 Although the punishment
for abusing animals differs widely among jurisdictions, all but seven states
make it a felony offense. 2 Some states, like New York, only make it a
felony if the acts of cruelty are performed on a companion animal. 3 Others,
like Pennsylvania, aggravate punishment if harm is caused to a dog, cat or
zoo animal. 4 The criminalization of cruelty to animals is by no means an
American phenomenon. Comprehensive anti-cruelty legislation has been
adopted in many countries, including the United Kingdom, Holland,
Australia and Argentina, to name a few.
Even though most countries seem to believe that it is desirable to
criminalize cruelty to animals, the reasons that justify prohibiting such
conduct are unclear. Whereas some jurisdictions appear to have been

1

See the Humane Society of the United States fact sheet on state animal cruelty statues as
of June 2007, in http://www.hsus.org/web-files/PDF/state_cruelty_chart.pdf.
2
Animal cruelty is a misdemeanor in Alaska, Arkansas, Idaho, Mississippi, North Dakota,
South Dakota and Utah. It should be noted that Mississippi has a special statute making it a
felony to engage in cruelty to livestock. Companion animals and wildlife fall outside the
purview of the law. Id.
3
NY Ag. & Mkts. Law § 353-a (1).
4
PA. ST 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5511
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partially motivated to enact the statutes because people who harm animals
are more likely to inflict suffering on human beings, others seem to have
been moved into action by a deeply felt conviction that inflicting harm on a
sentient being is morally wrong. Moreover, some state laws are drafted in a
manner that suggests that one of the preeminent reasons for adopting such
legislation was the protection of property.
Ascertaining the reasons that justify the practice of punishing people
for engaging in acts of cruelty against animals is not merely of theoretical
concern. As the recently decided case of People v. García 5 demonstrates, it
is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the proper scope of anti-cruelty
statutes without first answering the question of why it is that such conduct is
a crime in the first place. In García, the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of New York had to determine whether the defendant’s act of
stomping on a pet goldfish, in the presence of Juan, the nine year old
custodian of the fish, constituted a felony. In order to do so, the Court
needed to decide whether instantaneously killing a fish by stepping on him
constituted an act of “aggravated cruelty”.
Since the fish died instantly, the defendant contended that he did not
suffer extreme pain and that his death was caused without special depravity
or sadism. Thus, he asserted that the killing was not carried out with a

5

812 N.Y.S.2d 66 (2006).

6
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heightened level of cruelty. 6 The Court rejected the defendant’s contention
by pointing out that, in view of the legislative history of the statute, whether
an act demonstrates aggravated cruelty depends on “the state of mind of the
perpetrator”. 7 The Court’s holding also seemed to be heavily influenced by
the fact that the killing of a household pet in front of a child constitutes a
“sadistic and depraved act” because it is intended to “inflict emotional pain
on the boy”. 8
By concluding that a finding of aggravated cruelty depends on
whether the actor intended to make the owner of the animal suffer, the
Court was suggesting that the purpose of anti-cruelty statutes is to deter
people from engaging in acts that cause emotional harm to human beings
and not protecting animals from unjustifiable inflictions of pain. Thus,
according to García, the real victims in these cases are not the animals who
are being mistreated, but the humans who suffer when living creatures are
harmed.
This article will show that the Court’s reasoning in García cannot
withstand careful scrutiny. Concluding that anti-cruelty statutes were
enacted for reasons other than protecting animals from the unwarranted
infliction of pain is in tension with basic criminal law principles.

6

Id., at 261.
Id.
8
These were the words used by the trial court to describe the defendant’s act. People v.
García, 777 N.Y.S.2d 846.
7
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Furthermore, the best way to account for the most salient features of anticruelty statutes is by acknowledging that the victims to be protected by the
enactment of such laws are animals, not human beings. I will do so in four
parts.
Part I of provides a brief recount of the history of Anglo-American
statutes prohibiting harm to animals. This historical analysis will show that
many of these statutes were originally enacted as a way to protect private
property. However, it will also reveal that there has been a marked trend,
specially in recent times, to punish animal cruelty regardless, and
sometimes despite, the property interests involved.
In Part II, the notions of harm, victimhood and consent will be
explored in order to lay the groundwork for the claims that will be put forth
in the remainder of the article. It is difficult to have a meaningful discussion
about the interest that the law seeks to protect by criminalizing cruelty to
animals without first understanding the intricate interrelationship that exists
between these concepts. In light of the issues that animal cruelty statutes
raise, particular attention will be paid to discussing John Stuart Mill’s and
H.L.A. Hart’s conception of the “harm principle”. The legitimacy of
enacting victimless crimes and the ways in which consent can negate both
harm and victimhood will also be considered.
Part III examines five different theories that might be advanced in order

8
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to explain the interest that we seek to promote by punishing acts that are
harmful to animals, namely: (1) protection of property, (2) protection
against the infliction of emotional harm to those who have ties to the injured
animal, (3) prevention of future harm to humans, (4) enforcement of a
moral principle, and (5) protection of the animals themselves.
In Part IV I will try to explain why it is not necessarily the case, as some
animal law scholars have argued, that because animal cruelty statutes allow
for the infliction of harm to animals as a result of hunting, scientific and
farming activities, the interest primarily sought to be protected by these
laws is something other than the protection of animals. Although seductive
at first glance, this argument is ultimately flawed because it is premised on
a misunderstanding of the structure of criminal offenses in general and of
anti-cruelty statutes in particular. Properly understood, the existence of
privileges that allow people to infringe the prima facie norm against
harming animals merely reveals that society (rightly or wrongly) believes
that there are countervailing reasons that justify harming the interest sought
to be protected by the offense, not that the prohibitory norm was not really
designed to protect animals in the first place. 9

9

In criminal law terms, this can be restated in the following manner: the existence of a
justification (i.e. self-defense or choice of evils) provides the actor with reasons that allow
him to infringe the prima facie norm against engaging in such conduct (i.e. the “offense”).
This does not mean, however, that the existence of a justification (self-defense in a
homicide case, scientific tests in an animal cruelty case) cancels the reasons that the
offense provides us for not engaging in the conduct (protecting human life in homicide,
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I will conclude by arguing that we have decided to criminalize harm to
animals primarily because we are concerned about the wellbeing of such
creatures, not because doing so furthers some other human interest. Finally,
the Court’s analysis in People v. García will be reexamined in light of the
conclusions advanced in the article.

I. ANIMALS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: HISTORY AND CONTRADICTIONS
The first statute criminalizing abusive conduct towards animals was
enacted in Great Britain in 1822. The law, commonly known as “Martin’s
Act”, made it a crime to cruelly beat or otherwise mistreat horses, mules,
cows, sheep or other cattle. 10 At that point in time cruelty to animals did not
constitute an indictable offense at common law. 11 By adopting this statute,
the English Parliament filled this perceived gap in the law. Thus, prior to
the enactment of Martin’s Act, conduct constitutive of cruelty to animals
was only deemed criminal if it satisfied the elements of some other offense
made punishable at common law, such as breaches of the peace or
malicious mischief. 12 This represented a substantial shift in the state of the
law. Whereas at common law acts that inflicted unjustifiable pain on

protecting animals [arguably] in animal cruelty laws). See, generally, Gardner, Fletcher on
Offences and Defences, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 817 (2004).
10
An Act to Prevent the Cruel and Improper Treatment of Cattle (Martin's Act), 1822, 3
Geo. 4, ch. 71 (Eng.).
11
State v. Bruner, 12 N.E. 103, 104 (Ind. 1887).
12
Id. See also Republica v. Teischer, 1 Dall. 335 (Penn. 1788).

10
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animals were considered legal wrongs only if the creature harmed was the
property of another, after the passage of the Martin Act such conduct was a
crime even when the injured animal was not owned by anyone.
In the United States, as in England, mistreatment of animals was
first made a crime through legislation. However, in contrast with the early
statutes adopted in Great Britain, some of the anti-cruelty laws initially
enacted in America only made it a criminal offense for someone to engage
in abusive acts against animals not owned by the person mistreating the
creature. Take, for example, the 1846 Vermont statute which made it a
crime to “willfully and maliciously kill, wound, maim or disfigure any
horse, or horses, or horse kind, cattle, sheep or swine, of another person.” 13
By limiting the scope of the prohibition to acts that cause harm to animals
belonging to someone else, the Vermont General Assembly was making it
clear that the purpose of the statute was to protect property rights, not
animals.

Furthermore, by only punishing cruelty against animals of

commercial value, the legislature revealed that its preeminent reason for
prohibiting the conduct was to proscribe acts that were perceived to
adversely affect important economic interests. 14
Not all anti-cruelty laws adopted in America during the 19th century
were solely inspired by an interest to protect property rights. Some early

13

1846 Vt. Laws 34.
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statutes criminalized the malicious mistreatment of animals regardless of
whether they were the property of someone else. Thus, an 1829 New York
law made it a crime to “maliciously and cruelly beat or torture any horse, ox
or other cattle, or any sheep, whether belonging to himself or another”. 15
By making the ownership question irrelevant, this law signified an
important change in the legal discourse undergirding the anti-cruelty
movement. Whereas laws like the 1846 Vermont statute clearly regarded
the owner of the animal as the victim of the offense, statues like the 1829
New York law seemed to turn this conception of anti-cruelty legislation on
its head by implying that the legally protected interest was the animal, not
the owner.
It should be noted, however, that the 1829 New York law only
criminalized abusive conduct towards commercially valuable animals. This
brings to light a tension in anti-cruelty statutes that remains unresolved to
this day. It is not easy to reconcile the status of animals as victims with the
idea that only commercially valuable creatures are worthy of protection
from wanton acts of cruelty. If the purpose of prohibiting the conduct is to
protect animals from the unjustifiable infliction of pain, it is difficult to
understand why economic value should condition the scope of the statutes.
Unfortunately, albeit for different reasons, most modern anti-cruelty
14

See, generally, David Favre & Vivien Tsang, The Development of Anti-Cruelty Laws
During the 1800’s, 1 Detroit College of Law Review 1 (1993).
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statutes are plagued by similar incongruities. While a majority of
jurisdictions have expanded the scope of anti-cruelty statutes to encompass
the protection of animals that are not generally considered to be of
significant economic value, most state anti-cruelty statutes discriminate
between those individuals who harm a domesticated or companion animal
and those who injure non-domesticated animals. 16 Thus, the killing of a
rodent with a mousetrap inside private property is generally not considered
a crime. However, causing the death of a pet hamster is. Another salient
feature of modern anti-cruelty statutes is the tendency to afford heightened
legal protection to dogs and cats. In the states of Alabama and Kentucky,
for example, engaging in acts of cruelty towards a dog or cat is a felony.
Nonetheless, performing identical acts on horses, cows, rabbits, rodents or
any other animal is merely a misdemeanor. 17
In view of these considerations, modern anti-cruelty statutes, much
like their 19th century counterparts, are fraught with contradictions. On the
one hand, the push to expand the number of animals protected by anticruelty statutes and the increasing tendency to protect animals irrespective
of questions of ownership suggests that the purpose of adopting these laws

15

N.Y. Rev. stat. tit. 6, 26 (1829).
16
A couple of states have gone as far as arbitrarily excluding livestock from the
definition of “animals” protected by their anti-cruelty laws Iowa Code Ann. § 717(B)(1)
(West 1993 & Supp. 1998), Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-301(11)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1998) .
See http://www.animallaw.info/articles/arus5animall69.htm.
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is to safeguard animals from unnecessary suffering. On the other hand, the
different treatment that non-companion animals receive as opposed to
domesticated creatures indicates that the aim of these laws is something
other than the protection of animals from harm. If the objective of anticruelty statutes is to keep animals free from unnecessary suffering, why
should it matter whether the animal is domesticated? A rodent killed by a
mousetrap feels as much pain as a pet hamster killed in a similar manner.
However, only harm to the latter is deemed criminal under the typical anticruelty law.
New York’s current statute prohibiting abusive conduct towards
animals, commonly known as “Buster’s Law”, exemplifies many of the
contradictions that have been described here. 18 For starters, even though it
is considered a crime to perform acts of cruelty against any animal, it is
only a felony to engage in aggravated cruelty towards a “companion
animal”. Moreover, Buster’s Law contains an exemption that allows people
to engage in harmful acts against animals during the course of several
activities, such as fishing and hunting. As a result of this provision, the
killing of a trout during a recreational fishing trip does not constitute a
punishable crime, whereas the killing of a pet goldfish does. In light of
these considerations, it is unclear whether the chief purpose of Buster’s Law
17
18

Al. St. Sect. 12A-11-241.
NY Ag. & Mkts. Law § 353-a (1)
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is to protect animals from the unjustifiable infliction of pain or to deter
people from engaging in acts that harm individuals with strong emotional
ties to a particular animal or animals.
Unsurprisingly, in People v. García, the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York struggled to come to grips with the conflicting
rationales that seem to have underpinned the adoption of Buster’s Law in
particular and the enactment of anti-cruelty statutes in general. While on
several occasions the Court seemed to suggest that the victim of the offense
was the boy who suffered the loss of his beloved pet, on other occasions it
appeared to suggest that the real victim was the fish who was unjustifiably
harmed by the defendant. Complicating the matter is the fact that the
Court’s ruling was also influenced by the contention that cruelty to animals
should be prohibited because “man's inhumanity to man often begins with
inhumanity to those creatures that have formed particularly close
relationships with mankind”. 19

Consequently, the Court in García

elaborated three distinct (and sometimes conflicting) theories of the harm
that is sought to be prevented by anti-cruelty statutes: (1) harm to those who
have developed emotional ties to the animal, (2) harm to the animal, and (3)
the possibility of future harm to humans on the basis of a correlation
between violence against animals and violence against people.

19

People v. Garcia, 777 N.Y.S.2d 846.
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The purpose of the remainder of this article is to evaluate which of
these differing conceptions of anti-cruelty statutes better explains and
justifies our practices of blaming and punishing people for engaging in
abusive conduct against animals. Before doing so, however, it is necessary
to briefly examine the notions of victimhood, harm and consent.

II. VICTIMHOOD, CONSENT AND HARM
A. VICTIMHOOD
1. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
Generally speaking, a victim is a party against whom a person has
committed a crime. 20 Therefore, the notions of “victimhood” and harm are
intertwined. Someone is considered a victim only if he has been harmed by
another person. Usually, criminal statutes prohibit conduct that causes harm
to some important interest of the victim. Thus, the typical penal code
contains sections that prohibit “crimes against the person”, “crimes against
property”, “crimes against sexual autonomy”, and “crimes against liberty”.
In each of these instances, an crime is committed when someone
unjustifiably interferes with the fundamental interests of another person. In
the crime of theft, for example, the offender unlawfully interferes with
someone else’s right to private property. When someone commits homicide,
he is unjustifiably interfering with the victim’s right to life. In the case of

16
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rape, the perpetrator seeks pleasure by violating the victim’s fundamental
right to decide how and when he or she wants to engage in sexual
intercourse. 21
It should be noted, however, that there are many crimes whose
consummation does not entail causing harm to a victim. Most drug
possession offenses represent paradigmatic examples of these types of
crimes. Take, for example, the offense of possessing marijuana for personal
consumption. Note that this conduct in no way interferes with another
person’s fundamental interests. The person who commits this offense has
not denied the value of someone else’s life, nor has he interfered with the
rights of others. Thus, there is no victim whose interests are vindicated by
punishing the offender. 22 The perpetrator in these cases has violated a norm,
to be sure, but in doing so has not victimized anyone.
When, as in the case of drug possession offenses, the perpetrator’s
criminal conduct does not interfere with the interests of another person, he
is said to have engaged in a “victimless crime”. Additional examples of
offenses traditionally regarded as victimless crimes are prostitution, driving
while intoxicated, and engaging in consensual sodomy.
The government may have various reasons for prohibiting victimless

20

Markus Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse of Victim’s Rights
158 (NYU Press, 2002).
21
Luis E. Chiesa, Taking Victims Seriously: A Dworkinian Theory of Punishment, ___
Rev. Jur. U.P.R. ___ (forthcoming, 2008).
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crimes. Sometimes these types of offenses are created as a way of enforcing
moral principles. This is most often the case when the state prohibits certain
types of consensual sexual conduct. The criminalization of consensual
sodomy constitutes a prime example. Even though engaging in such
conduct harms neither the persons who perform the act nor third parties, it
has been prohibited because many individuals consider sodomy to be an act
that contravenes their religious and moral beliefs. 23
Occasionally the state decides to create a victimless crime as a way
to deter people from engaging in acts that may harm someone in the future.
This tends to be the purpose of prohibiting the act of driving under the
influence of intoxicants. Although driving while intoxicated is not harmful
per se, those who engage in such conduct are more likely to injure someone
than those who do not. In these cases the objective of the criminal sanction
shifts from exacting retribution for a harm done to preventatively
neutralizing dangerous individuals before they engage in harmful conduct.
Sometimes, as in the case of environmental crimes, it is unclear
whether the government has created a victimless crime. Consider the
offense of knowingly releasing hazardous pollutants into the air. 24 Engaging
in this conduct does not directly interfere with the interests of others. Thus,
at first glance, this offense seems to constitute a victimless crime. However,
22
23

Id.
See, for example, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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the aggregate effect of pollution will almost certainly result in harm to our
health. Hence, in the long run, we are all going to be victims of the
pernicious consequences of this conduct. Due to the resulting future harm, it
can be coherently argued that the offense of releasing a hazardous pollutant
into the air is not a victimless crime despite the fact that such conduct does
not directly harm anyone at the time the act occurs.
The legitimacy of creating victimless crimes has been increasingly
called into question. As time has passed, societies have become more
democratic and government less authoritarian, and the focus of the criminal
law has shifted from the safeguarding of the State to the protection of
persons. 25 Once it is accepted that the chief purpose of penal statutes is to
vindicate the rights of those that have been harmed by the perpetrator’s
harmful conduct, it is difficult to justify punishing people for engaging in
acts that do not interfere with the rights of individuals. Taking this
contention seriously should lead us to question the legitimacy of creating
victimless crimes, particularly when the only reason for doing so is to
enforce a particular conception of morality by way of the criminal law.
This is not to say, however, that prohibiting conduct that does not
cause harm to a victim is necessarily illegitimate. No one seriously believes,
for example, that criminalizing the act of driving while intoxicated is
24
25

42 U.S.C.A. § 7401
Dubber, supra note 20, pp. 152.
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injudicious or unjustifiable. Although such conduct does not entail
interference with the interests of others, the undeniable dangerousness of
the act seems to provide a more than adequate reason for its prohibition.
Nevertheless, in the absence of compelling reasons that point to the
contrary, victimless crimes are generally considered to be at least prima
facie or presumptively illegitimate. However, this presumption of
illegitimacy can be rebutted by demonstrating that there are sound reasons
for prohibiting the conduct.

2. VICTIMHOOD AND ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES

It is unclear whether anti-cruelty statutes prohibit victimless crimes.
If one considers that the chief purpose of these laws is to protect property
rights, then it should follow that there is a legally protected victim -- the
owner of the harmed creature. If conceived in this manner, animal cruelty
statutes would be considered a species of the more general crime of criminal
damages.
On the other hand, if one conceives laws criminalizing the
mistreatment of animals as enactments that purport to deter people from
inflicting suffering on those who have strong emotional ties to the creatures,
the victim of the offense would be the person whose sensibilities were
affected by the act of the perpetrator. This conception of victimhood seemed

20
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to partially inform the reasoning of the court in People v. Garcia. By
implying that the defendant’s act revealed a heightened level of cruelty
because the killing of the goldfish caused Juan much suffering, the court
seemed to be suggesting that the victim in these cases is the individual who
suffers when someone harms a creature that he holds dear.
It can also be argued that cruelty to animals is a crime because those
who mistreat animals are more likely to harm human beings than those who
do not. If this were the case, the purpose of punishing those who
unjustifiably make animals suffer would be to neutralize dangerous
individuals before they engage in conduct that could harm a human being.
Under this conception, cruelty to animals would constitute a victimless
crime, since the conduct is considered criminal in light of the fact that it
reveals the dangerous nature of the offender and not because the act
interferes with the rights of persons. In People v. Garcia the Court seemed
to have had this conception of anti-cruelty statutes in mind when it asserted
that these laws were enacted in recognition that “man’s inhumanity to man
often begins with inhumanity to [animals]”. 26
Legislation proscribing the infliction of harm on animals can also be
defended on the grounds that a majority of the population considers such
conduct to be immoral. If the perceived immorality of unnecesarily harming

26

People v. Garcia, 777 N.Y.S.2d 846.
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animals is the sole basis for criminalization of animal cruelty, offenses
prohibiting such conduct would clearly constitute victimless crimes.
Finally, it might be argued that the purpose of laws that make
cruelty to animals a crime is to protect the creatures from unjustifiable
inflictions of pain. Under this conception of anti-cruelty statutes the victim
of the offense is the animal harmed by the wrongful conduct of the
perpetrator. This approach necessarily requires that we interpret the notion
of “victimhood” in a broad manner so as to allow for non-humans to qualify
as victims. Some criminal law theorists object to this expansion of the
concept noting that only autonomous beings can have their rights violated in
such a manner that it is appropriate to label them as “victims”. 27

B. CONSENT
1. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
The notions of consent and victimless crimes are intertwined. As a
general rule, someone is considered a victim only when he has been forced
to do something that he would otherwise not wish to do. If the person
consents to the act that the alleged offender wanted him to perform, we
would be hard-pressed to believe that he was victimized by the offender.
Therefore, a victim’s consent changes what initially appears to be an
unjustifiable act of forceful subjugation into a permissible act of self-

22
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determination. 28 As Professor Dubber aptly points out:
By consenting, the apparent victim rebuts the presumption of
victimhood. He
indicates that another’s act that facially
satisfies the elements of a crime does no
harm to his autonomy
in fact. In light of the consent, an apparent act of heteronomy is
revealed as an act of autonomy. 29
The transformative effect of consent is apparent in cases involving
the alleged commission of a rape. In these cases, the consent of the victim
transforms what would otherwise be considered a deplorable act of sexual
imposition into an unobjectionable act of lovemaking. 30 By consenting to
the conduct the person is making a conscious decision about what types of
acts make his life a life worth living. Therefore, in the absence of coercion
or of legal capacity to acquiesce to the act, the consenting victim is
suffering no interference with his rights that need to be vindicated by the
infliction of punishment. 31 Upon closer inspection, it turns out that
punishing someone for performing an act to which the alleged victim
consented is tantamount to punishing someone for committing a victimless
crime. The reason for this is that if the victim consents to the act, he is not
really a victim at all. Consequently, punishing the supposed offender for
engaging in the consented act is as objectionable as inflicting punishment
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on a person who committed an act that did not cause harm to a victim. 32
Despite the undeniable transformative effects of consent, courts
have been slow to recognize the acquiescence of the victim as a defense to
criminal liability. The reticence has been more palpable in cases involving
the infliction of physical injury or death. Thus, courts have been reluctant to
allow defendants to plead consent as a defense to the crime of assault. More
controversially, many jurisdictions have refused to recognize an
individual’s informed consent to euthanasia as a defense to the crimes of
murder and assisting in suicide.
Although courts have been generally unwilling to recognize the
assent of the victim as a defense to a violent offense, consent is widely
accepted as a defense to crimes against property. It has consistently been
held that the taking of property does not constitute theft if the owner of the
item consented to it. 33 Similarly, a defendant cannot be found guilty of
criminal mischief if the owner of the property consented to its damage or
destruction. Furthermore, since the owner has the right to do what he wishes
with his property, he cannot be convicted of committing the offense of
criminal mischief if he decides to damage his own property. 34
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Chiesa, supra note 21.
33
State v Fahlk, 524 N.W.2d 39 (Neb 1994), People v Smith, 120 Cal. Rptr.2d 831
(2002)
34
McKinney's Penal Law § 145.00
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2. CONSENT AND ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES
The consent doctrine raises two important issues in the context of

anti-cruelty statutes. The first matter warranting consideration is whether an
animal owner’s decision to inflict pain on a creature that rightfully belongs
to him is (or should be) considered criminal. Also meriting consideration is
whether someone who harms or kills an animal is (or should be) guilty of a
crime if the owner of the creature consented to the act. The way in which
we approach these issues will depend on the conception of anti-cruelty
statutes that we adopt. On the one hand, the owner’s decision to allow his
animal to be harmed or killed should not generate criminal liability if one
considers that the purpose of anti-cruelty statutes is to protect property
rights. On the other hand, if one believes that the purpose of proscribing
animal abuse is to protect animals from unjustifiable inflictions of pain, the
owner’s consent to the harmful conduct should be irrelevant.

C. THE HARM PRINCIPLE
1. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
Closely related to the question of whether it is legitimate to punish
people for committing a victimless crime is the doctrine that has come to be
called the “harm principle”. First elaborated by the famous philosopher
John Stuart Mill, this principle has been employed as a means to limit the
government’s power to criminalize conduct. According to his formulation
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of the doctrine, “the only purpose for which power can rightfully be
exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will is to
prevent harm to others”. 35 As a result of this, Mill concluded that the
government could not legitimately prohibit an act solely to promote the
physical or moral wellbeing of the person engaging in the conduct.
Furthermore, he asserted that the fact that most people consider the
performance of a particular act to be wrong or unwise is not a sufficient
reason to warrant criminalizing the conduct. 36
Mill’s thesis was later echoed and further developed by the legal
theorist H.L.A. Hart. Hart believed that to prohibit conduct merely because
it is considered immoral is illegitimate because doing so would contradict
fundamental liberty interests. He also stated that the distress that people
feel when others conduct themselves in what they consider to be an
immoral fashion cannot constitute a punishable harm, since this would be
“tantamount to punishing them simply because others object to what they
do; and the only liberty that could coexist with this extension of the
utilitarian principle (“harm principle”) is liberty to do those things to which
no one seriously objects. Such liberty plainly is quite nugatory.” 37 In other
words, according to Hart, criminalizing acts because of their immorality is
illegitimate because it assigns only trifling importance to the fundamental
35
36

John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 10-11 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed.,1978)
Id.
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right of individual autonomy. 38
One important consequence of the harm principle is that it casts
doubt on the propriety of criminalizing an act merely because of its
dangerousness. Prohibiting such conduct is problematic because “these
offenses do not proscribe harm itself, but rather the possibility of harm; a
possibility that need not (and typically does not) materialize when the
offense is committed.” 39 There are myriad examples of non-harmful acts
that are considered criminal solely because they create risks of harms.
Perhaps the most prevalent one is the criminalization of the unauthorized
possession of a weapon. Although the mere possession of a weapon is not
harmful to anyone, it presumably increases the risk that the possessor might
use it to injure someone. The justifiability of making use of this type of
offense as a way of neutralizing dangerous offenders before they engage in
harmful conduct is unclear.

It is safe to say, however, that the more

concrete the risk sought to be prevented by the offense is, the more
justifiable it is to criminalize the conduct. Conversely, as the inherent
dangerousness of the conduct decreases, the reasons in favor of
criminalizing the act get progressively weaker. Compare, for example, the
relative merits of the decision to criminalize the possession of tools
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commonly used for criminal purposes with the prohibition of the possession
of weapons. Whereas most people seem to believe that criminalizing the
latter is justifiable, there are considerable doubts with regards to whether
prohibiting the former is proper. The key to explaining this distinction lies
in the inherent dangerousness of the items involved. Thus, it has been
asserted that an “account of the difference between weapons....and burglar
tools...is that the former are dangerous or thought to be dangerous to all
those who might come in contact with them [whereas the latter are not]”. 40
Since weapons pose a more serious risk of causing grave harm to others
than tools, the decision to criminalize their possession is more defensible
than the choice to prohibit possessing tools.
While the harm principle initially afforded courts and commentators
with an effective tool with which to condemn the enactment of laws that
were adopted to enforce public morality, the principle has been criticized
because of the malleability and vagueness of the concept of “harm”. 41 Many
statutes that appear to prohibit conduct solely as a way of enforcing moral
principles can be easily recast as enactments that aim to prevent the
causation of indirect harm. Thus, Professor Catharine MacKinnon has
argued that governmental regulation of pornography, once thought to be at
odds with the harm principle, can be justified on morally neutral grounds
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because it is harmful to women since it perpetuates sexism, promotes the
subjugation of women and fosters inequality. 42 In a similar fashion, former
New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani justified his crackdown on sex
shops and peep shows in Times Square by focusing on the indirect societal
harm that they cause, not on their immorality.
Despite its shortcomings, the harm principle serves to limit the
government’s power of criminalization by requiring that the state provide
reasons for prohibiting conduct other than the fact that it is generally
considered to be immoral. In some cases, the state can justify prohibiting
conduct by pointing to its evident dangerousness (drunk driving, for
example) or by demonstrating that the long term benefits of proscribing
what would otherwise appear to be an innocuous act justifies criminalizing
such conduct (banning certain pornographic materials as a way of curbing
sexism and discrimination, for example). However, the government will
occasionally not be able to provide reasons for criminalizing conduct
besides its perceived immorality. The prohibition of certain sexual acts
provides a case in point. In the landmark decision of Lawrence v. Texas, for
example, the United States Supreme Court had to decide whether a law
making consensual sodomy a crime violated the liberty interests protected
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See, generally, Berard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 Journal of
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by the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In language that closely
mirrors Mill’s formulation of the harm principle, the Court justified striking
down the statute by pointing out that “[t]he fact that the governing majority
in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.” 43

2. THE HARM PRINCIPLE AND ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES
The famous English jurist Lord Devlin once argued that anti-cruelty
statutes were solely enacted as a way of publicly enforcing the widely
shared view that unjustifiably inflicting pain on an animal is immoral. 44 If
Lord Devlin’s characterization of such laws is correct, criminalizing the
mistreatment of animals would seem to violate the harm principle. This
would cast doubt on the legitimacy of enacting such legislation.
Lord Devlin’s conception of anti-cruelty statutes is by no means
universally held. In a famous reply to Devlin, H.L.A. Hart pointed out that:
It is too often assumed that if a law is not designed to protect one
man from another its only rationale can be that it is designed to
punish moral wickedness or, in Lord Devlin’s words, “to enforce a
moral principle”. Thus it is often urged that statutes punishing
cruelty to animals can only be explained in that way. But it is
certainly intelligible, both as an account of the original motives
inspiring such legislation and as the specification of an aim widely
held to be worth pursuing, to say that the law is here concerned with
the suffering, albeit only of animals, rather than with the immorality
of torturing them. Certainly no one who supports this use of the
criminal law is thereby bound in consistency to admit that the law
43
44
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may punish forms of immorality which involve no suffering to any
sentient being.
Thus, anti-cruelty legislation does not violate the harm principle as long

as we interpret the principle as one that allows for the justifiable imposition
of punishment whenever the actor’s conduct causes harm to another
sentient being (i.e. humans and animals).

III. THE INTERESTS SOUGHT TO BE PROTECTED BY ANTI-CRUELTY
STATUTES: FIVE PLAUSIBLE THEORIES
A. PROTECTION OF PROPERTY
1. THE CASE IN FAVOR OF CONCEIVING ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES AS A WAY
OF PROTECTING PROPERTY INTERESTS
Professor Gary Francione recently stated that, “as far as the law is
concerned, animals are nothing more than commodities”. 45 This has led
him, and many others, 46 to conclude that, for all relevant legal purposes,
animals are treated as property. As a result of this, it would be tempting to
conclude that the purpose of anti-cruelty statutes is to protect the property
interests that humans have in animals.
The contention that the purpose of prohibiting abusive conduct
against animals is to protect property rights finds some historical support.
As was discussed in Part I of this article, cruelty to animals was not a crime
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at common law. At the time, killing or harming an animal would be
considered an offense only if doing so satisfied some other crime
punishable at common law. If any such offense were to be infringed, it
would typically be a crime against property such as trespass or criminal
mischief. Similarly, the first anti-cruelty statute only made it punishable for
someone to mistreat animals belonging to another person. Therefore, the
owner of the creature was originally free to inflict as much pain on the
animal as he saw fit.
Recent enactments have generally broadened the scope of anticruelty offenses to nominally encompass the protection of most animals,
including those that are not owned by anyone. This might suggest that,
contrary to their 19th century counterparts, modern anti-cruelty statutes
protect interests other than property. It should be noted, however, that some
aspects of these laws do seem to perpetuate the notion that anti-cruelty
statutes are enacted primarily as a way of protecting private property.
Consider, for example, how the protection afforded to certain animals, such
as fish or birds, depends on whether they belong to someone or not. Most
statutes generally authorize people to harm fish or birds if they do so while
fishing or hunting. Since no one has a claim of right over these animals
while they are living in the wild, at least until they catch, trap or kill them,
harming them does not affect any property interest. However, the legal
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protection afforded to these creatures substantially increases once the
animal belongs to someone. Thus, the acquisition of property rights over
these kinds of animals has a significant transformative effect. Before they
become private property, many people are free to harm them. However,
once someone has a claim of right over the creature, no one, with the
possible exception of the owner, can lawfully mistreat the animal.
It is worth mentioning that if what is sought to be protected by anticruelty statutes is a property interest, the victim of such crimes would be the
owner of the animal, not the creature itself. If conceived in this manner,
these statutes should not be regarded as enacting a victimless crime.
Furthermore, if the reason for criminalizing the mistreatment of animals is
to avoid harm to property, the enactment of anti-cruelty statutes also
satisfies the harm principle.
2. THE CASE AGAINST CONCEIVING ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES AS A WAY OF
PROTECTING PROPERTY INTERESTS
Even though a property-based conception of anti-cruelty statutes
adequately explains certain features of these laws, it fails to account for
some of their most distinctive characteristics. Consider the significant
protection given to dogs and cats in most jurisdictions (mistreating a dog or
cat is considered a felony in many states, whereas mistreating some other
animal is not). The increased degree of protection provided to these animals
does not depend on whether they are owned by someone. Thus, torturing a

Why is it a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish?

33

stray dog is considered a felony in most states regardless of whether
someone has a claim of right over the animal.
Property based conceptions of anti-cruelty laws are also difficult to
reconcile with statutes that make it a crime to encourage dog-fighting or
cock-fighting. Such conduct is considered an offense in all fifty states. 47
Interestingly, the act remains criminal even if the owners of the animals
voluntarily decide to engage in the activity. Since these laws protect
animals in circumstances in which doing so will be detrimental to the
pecuniary interests of their owners, the protection conferred in this context
is incompatible with the position that anti-cruelty statutes are primarily
enacted as a way to advance property interests.
It should also be noted that every jurisdiction makes it criminal for
the owner of a pet to mistreat his animal. The adoption of this type of
legislation is at odds with a property-based conception of anti-cruelty
statutes because the unqualified protection afforded to pets against harmful
acts of their owners is contrary to the general principle of property law that
an owner has a right to do what he wishes to his property, including
destroying or damaging it.

47

7 U.S.C.A § 2156 (2007), NY Ag. & Mkts. Law § 351
The only U.S. jurisdiction in which cock-fighting is not considered a crime is Puerto
Rico. The reason for this seems to lie in the cultural and historical significance that cockfighting has for many people in the island, particularly those who are over 60 and live in
rural areas.
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B. PROTECTION AGAINST EMOTIONAL HARM

1. THE CASE IN FAVOR OF CONCEIVING ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES AS A
MEANS OF PROTECTING HUMANS AGAINST THE INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
HARM
It might be cogently argued that the chief purpose of anti-cruelty
statutes is to prevent people from causing harm to persons with strong
emotional ties to the mistreated animal. I will call this theory the “emotional
harm” conception of animal-cruelty statutes. This conception dovetails in
several important respects with the property-based approach to animal
cruelty laws. Since the owners of animals often develop strong emotional
ties to their animals, they will typically be the ones who suffer the most
when someone unjustifiably harms their pets. Ownership, however, is not
necessarily determinative of whether someone has developed a close
emotional relationship with the animal. One can easily imagine instances in
which the owner of the creature has no affective attachment to his pet. By
the same token, one can conceive of many instances in which someone
other than the owner has cultivated a close sentimental link with the animal.
As a result of this, ownership is typically, though not necessarily, indicative
of a significant emotional bond with the animal. However, under this
conception of anti-cruelty statutes, the ultimate purpose of these laws is to
protect people from suffering emotional harm, not to safeguard their
property interests.
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The “emotional harm” approach to animal cruelty laws is
particularly apt for explaining the heightened level of legal protection that is
traditionally afforded to companion animals. According to the American
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), companion
animals are “domesticated or domestic-bred animals whose physical,
emotional, behavioral and social needs can be readily met as companions in
the home, or in close daily relationship with humans.” 48 This definition is
similar to the ones adopted in the majority of jurisdictions in the United
States. 49 Thus, by definition, companion animals are those creatures that are
more likely to have close and significant ties with human beings.
Consequently, if one believes that the principal aim of anti-cruelty statutes
is to prevent people from engaging in conduct that can sever the strong link
that unites animals and humans, it makes sense to protect companion
animals more than other creatures.
So conceived, animal-cruelty statutes would seem to satisfy the
harm principle, for the principal reason of criminalizing the conduct would
be to avoid emotional harm to others. Furthermore, these statutes would not
create victimless crimes, since there is a victim whose interests are
vindicated by punishing those who infringe the norm against harming
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animals -- the human with close ties to the creature.
This appeared to be the conception of animal cruelty laws that the lower
court had in mind in People v. García when it seemed to suggest that the
defendant’s actions evinced an increased degree of cruelty because they
were calculated to inflict suffering on the person with the closest emotional
ties to the pet goldfish- Juan. By focusing on the impact that the
perpetrator’s conduct had on the boy instead of the harm that the act caused
to the animal, the Court was clearly implying that the principal aim of the
statute is to prevent human suffering, not to protect animals from
unjustifiable inflictions of pain.

2. THE CASE AGAINST CONCEIVING ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES AS A MEANS
OF PROTECTING HUMANS AGAINST THE INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL HARM
The proposition that the purpose of anti-cruelty statutes is to protect
humans from emotional harm cannot be easily reconciled with the broad
scope of typical animal cruelty laws. Take, for example, South Dakota’s
animal cruelty statute. This law makes it a crime to harm any “mammal,
bird, reptile, amphibian, or fish” by engaging in any “act or omission
whereby unnecessary, unjustifiable, or unreasonable physical pain or
suffering is caused, permitted, or allowed to continue including acts of
mutilation”. 50 The statute protects many animals (most reptiles and
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amphibians) that typically do not have close daily relationships with
humans. Giving legal protection to such animals is difficult to explain under
an “emotional harm” approach to animal cruelty statutes. Furthermore,
harming stray dogs or cats is considered a crime even if no one has
developed a strong emotional bond with the animals. This is the case even if
the creature harmed is despised by most or all of the members of the
community. As far as the law is concerned, animals are deemed worthy of
legal protection whether they are liked or not.
Finally, the emotional harm approach to animal cruelty statutes cannot
satisfactorily account for the widespread prohibition of dog and cock
fighting. Most of the people who participate in this type of activity treat the
animals involved as either a source of income or as entertainment.
Moreover, they are evidently aware of the fact that many of the animals will
suffer great pain and/or death as a result of the fights. Since the people
involved in these sports treat the animals involved as disposable objects that
exist solely to generate money or pleasure, it cannot be said that the
principal reason for criminalizing dog or cock fighting is to prevent
psychological harm to those who have developed close ties to the animals.
In these cases conduct is made criminal despite the fact that the people
generally associated with these events do not suffer when the animals are in
pain. Typically, the opposite seems to be true: they enjoy watching the
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creatures suffer.
C. PREVENTION OF FUTURE HARM TO HUMANS
1. THE CASE IN FAVOR OF CONCEIVING ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES AS A
MEANS OF PREVENTING FUTURE HARM TO HUMANS
Perhaps the mainstream belief with regard to animal cruelty statutes is
that they are enacted as a way of identifying and neutralizing presumptively
dangerous individuals before they engage in acts that are harmful to human
beings. I will dub this view the “future harm” conception of anti-cruelty
statutes. The philosophical roots of this view can be traced back to
Immanuel Kant, who once famously stated that “he who is cruel to animals
becomes hard also in his dealings with men. We can judge the heart of a
man by his treatment of animals”. 51
Defenders of this approach to anti-cruelty statutes believe that
criminalizing the mistreatment of animals is warranted because “[t]here is
ample evidence to suggest that individuals who engage in acts of animal
cruelty have a greater probability of committing acts of violence against
people as compared to individuals who have no history of committing acts
of violence against animals.” 52 This conception is so prevalent that many
organizations devoted to the protection of animals have defended it in an
effort to justify the enactment of broader anti-cruelty legislation. The “First
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Strike” campaign of the Humane Society constitutes one such example. The
purpose of this program is to reduce animal abuse by “rais[ing] public and
professional awareness about the connection between animal cruelty and
other violent crime violence and to help communities identify some of the
origins of violence, predict its patterns, and prevent its escalation”. 53
There is significant evidence tending to demonstrate that a
correlation between animal cruelty and interpersonal violence exists.
Anecdotal confirmation of this link abounds. Some of the most famous
serial killers, including the Hillside strangler, Son of Sam, the Boston
Strangler and Ted Bundy had a history of abusing animals. 54 Empirical
evidence also seems to substantiate the correlation. According to some
studies, animal abusers are at least four times more likely to commit violent
crimes or offenses against property than those who do not mistreat
animals. 55
Adoption of the “future harm” conception of animal-cruelty statutes
should lead to punishing only those acts that have been shown to be
correlated to interpersonal violence. This might explicate why it is typically
not considered criminal to harm animals during the course of certain

of Animal Abuse, 4 Animal Law 1, 8 (1998).
53
First Strike: The Connection Between Animal Cruelty and Human Violence, at
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54
Lacroix, supra note 52, pp. 8.
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activities, such as fishing, hunting and farming. Since there is no significant
link between engaging in such activities and violence against people, those
who believe that animal-cruelty statutes should be adopted as a way of
preventing future harm to humans do not have legitimate reasons for
punishing such conduct.
The Garcia court expressly recognized that one of the considerations
that motivated the adoption of New York’s anti-cruelty statute was the
connection between animal abuse and violent crimes. This was such a
preeminent concern of lawmakers that then Governor Pataki defended the
proposed amendments to the anti-cruelty statutes by pointing out that
“gruesome acts [of torture endured by animals], coupled with recent studies
that reveal a correlation between violence against animals and future acts of
violence against humans, underscore the need to enhance penalties for
animal cruelty”. 56
2. THE CASE AGAINST CONCEIVING ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES AS A MEANS
OF PREVENTING FUTURE HARM TO HUMANS
According to the future harm conception of anti-cruelty statutes, the
purpose of enacting laws criminalizing animal abuse is to identify
dangerous individuals before they decide to harm a human being. If this
were the case, the justifiability of adopting such laws would be questionable

humans 6 ANIMAL L. 1 (2000)
56
Jennifer S. Rosa, Recent Developments in New York Law, 74 St. John’s L. Rev. 287,
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because doing so would violate the harm principle. Since the possible harm
sought to be prevented by criminalizing animal cruelty – future injury to
human beings – does not always transpire, it cannot be held that such
conduct is prohibited because it causes direct harm to others, as the harm
principle would require.
Furthermore, a legislature would be creating a victimless crime if it
proscribed animal mistreatment solely because of its correlation with
interpersonal violence. By ascertaining that the purpose of animal cruelty
statutes is to avoid injury to a victim in the future, the legislature is
implying that the perpetrator’s present conduct doesn’t yet interfere with
personal interests. As was previously discussed, the legitimacy of
prohibiting conduct that does not violate the rights of a victim is unclear.
The future harm conception of anti-cruelty statutes inevitably leads
to shifting the focus of these laws from avoiding harm to animals to
neutralizing presumptively dangerous individuals. Therefore, as one
commentator has suggested, the decision to criminalize abusive treatment of
animals as a way to prevent possible future harm to humans is grounded on
the “recognition that the solution to a violent society does not lie in the
characterization of the victim but in the characteristics of the offender.” 57
This might explain why the Garcia court suggested that the key to
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determining whether the defendant should be convicted of a felony because
his act evinced a heightened degree of cruelty required an examination of
his state of mind instead of an assessment of the amount of pain inflicted on
the pet goldfish. If the principal purpose of anti-cruelty laws is to prevent
future harm to humans, the gradation of punishment for animal abuse
should be dependent on the perceived dangerousness of the offender and not
on the actual anguish endured by the creature.

This is somewhat

counterintuitive. Why should a finding of aggravated cruelty depend on
anything other than an evaluation of the degree and extent of the suffering
of the victim?
It is also worth mentioning that the future harm conception of laws
proscribing animal abuse cannot satisfactorily account for two distinctive
features of modern anti-cruelty legislation, namely: the criminalization of
negligent mistreatment of pets and the prohibition of cock fighting.
Empirical studies demonstrate that there is a correlation between intentional
acts of cruelty against animals and interpersonal violence. Thus, researchers
have been quick to point out that many murderers have a history of
intentionally harming animals by, for example, setting them on fire. 58
However, no proven link exists between negligent mistreatment of pets and

58

6 ANIMAL L. 1, 21 Enacting and enforcing felony animal cruelty laws to prevent
violence against humans (2000)

Why is it a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish?

43

future acts of violence against humans. 59 The person who carelessly forgets
to arrange to have her pet fed during a vacation is guilty of animal abuse
despite the fact that performing such conduct does not substantially increase
the likelihood that the pet owner will harm a human being in the future.
Similarly, encouraging cock fighting is a crime although the people
involved in it are typically not more likely to engage in violent interpersonal
crime than those who do not partake in such activities. The absence of a
correlation between participation in cock fighting and violence against
humans is particularly evident in the case of the many Latinos who view the
practice of breeding and training fighting cocks as a family and cultural
tradition. 60 It would be absurd to argue that the Latinos who engage in cock
fighting are more prone to inflicting harm on humans than the average
person. Thus, the future harm conception of anti-cruelty statutes is a
particularly weak basis upon which to ground the criminalization of cock
fighting. It seems obvious that such spectacles are banned in order to avoid
unjustifiable harm to animals, not as a means of preventing future possible
harm to humans.
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of violence against humans and the link with violent behavior towards animals, but does
not suggest negligent treatment of animals has a link with future harm to humans.
60
See, Cockfighting Still Popular in Puerto Rico (article discussing cock fighting as a
tradition and considered a gentleman’s sport in country of Puerto Rico), in
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=2822082
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D. ENFORCEMENT OF MORAL VIEWS HELD BY A MAJORITY OF THE
POPULATION
1. THE CASE IN FAVOR OF CONCEIVING ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES AS A
MEANS OF ENFORCING A MORAL PRINCIPLE
Various courts and commentators (most notably, Lord Devlin) have

posited that the chief purpose of anti-cruelty legislation is to promote a
moral view held by a majority of the population. 61 I will call this approach
the “public enforcement of morality” conception of animal cruelty statutes.
Proponents of this conception argue that the perceived immorality of the
conduct justifies its criminalization.
This conception is appealing because most people do believe that
unjustifiably inflicting harm on an animal is immoral. Thus, the elegance of
this view lies in its simplicity. Why should we not criminalize that which
most, if not all, deem to be a morally objectionable course of action?
Another advantage of the public enforcement of morality conception
of anti-cruelty laws is that it can satisfactorily explain why it is generally
not considered criminal to harm animals during the course of certain
activities such as fishing and hunting. Since most people consider that
fishing and hunting constitute instances of morally acceptable behavior, no
moral principle would be promoted by proscribing such conduct.
This view of animal cruelty legislation also succeeds where most
61

Gary Francione, Animals, property, and legal welfarism: “Unnecessary” suffering
and the “humane” treatmet of animals 46 Rutgers. L. Rev 721 (1994)
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other approaches fail. The criminalization of dog and cock fighting is easily
explicable under this conception. These activities were not considered
criminal in the past because at that time there was no clear consensus with
regards to whether or not engaging in such behavior was deemed immoral.
However, as time has passed and societal values have changed, different
groups of people have coalesced in decrying the immorality of animal
abuse. The crystallization of this moral consensus paved the way for the
proscription of the conduct in modern times.

2. THE CASE AGAINST CONCEIVING ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES AS A MEANS
OF ENFORCING A MORAL PRINCIPLE
The principal objection that can be leveled against the public
enforcement of morality view of animal cruelty statutes is that most courts
and commentators believe that the fact that a majority of the population
believes that a certain act is immoral is not in itself a sufficient reason for
criminalizing the conduct. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court in
Lawrence v. Texas is worth repeating: “[t]he fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral
is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”
Furthermore, this conception of anti-cruelty legislation is wholly
incompatible with the harm principle. Taking this principle seriously
requires that we only proscribe conduct that interferes with the rights of
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others. However, no one has a right to have his own moral views publicly
enforced by way of the criminal law. This is the case even when a person’s
moral principles coincide with those held by a substantial portion of the
population. People should not have to endure punishment and the
deprivation of liberty and/or property that it entails just because many
object to his conduct on purely moral grounds. In a tolerant and pluralistic
society, something in addition to the perceived immorality of the actor’s
conduct must be shown before we deem that person to be a “criminal”.

E. PREVENTION OF HARM TO ANIMALS
1. THE CASE IN FAVOR OF CONCEIVING ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES AS A
MEANS OF PREVENTING HARM TO ANIMALS
Perhaps the interest sought to be protected by anti-cruelty statutes is the
prevention of harm to animals. After all, these laws are typically referred to
as “animal” cruelty statutes. The view that these laws aim to protect
animals from the unjustifiable infliction of pain has much to commend it.
For starters, it seems to explain the most salient features of modern anticruelty legislation. The decisions to criminalize the negligent mistreatment
of pets and to proscribe dog and cock fighting can easily be accounted for
under this conception. Since negligently mistreating animals causes them to
suffer unnecessarily, it is perfectly sensible to proscribe such conduct in
order to protect the creatures. Similarly, given that dogs and cocks used in
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fights endure incredible amounts of pain, there are legitimate reasons to
prohibit the fights as a means of furthering the protection of the animals
involved.
Moreover, contrary to the public enforcement of morality view, the
conception of anti-cruelty statutes discussed in this section is compatible
with the harm principle. As H.L.A. Hart has rightly pointed out,
criminalizing animal abuse does not violate this principle as long as we
construe it in such a way that allows for the criminalization of conduct that
harms a sentient being. The proscription of conduct that interferes with the
fundamental interests of others is universally held to be legitimate. Thus,
provided that we consider animals to have interests worthy of legal
protection, there should be no objection to prohibiting animal abuse.
Fortunately, most people now believe that animals do have an interest in
being held free from unnecessary suffering. This basic interest stems from
their sentience, that is, from their capacity to experience pain. Since our
experience has led us to conclude that feeling pain is an unpleasant
occurrence, we have good reason to abstain ourselves from causing pain to
other beings, whether they are human or not.
As long as anti-cruelty statutes are conceived as laws that protect
animals from enduring direct suffering, they would not constitute victimless
crimes. So conceived, the legally protected victim would be the creature
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harmed by the perpetrator’s conduct. Some would object to this
conceptualization of victimhood by pointing out that only human beings
should qualify as victims. 62 This argument would only hold, however, if
there were some distinctive human characteristic beyond the capacity to feel
pain that might justify affording humans more legal protection than animals.
Professor Dubber believes that the human capacity for exercising
meaningful autonomy over their lives warrants such a differentiated
treatment. 63 The problem with this contention is that humans are considered
victims even if they lack the capacity to meaningfully exercise their
autonomy. A newly born child, for example, has no more capacity for
autonomy than a dog or a monkey. Nevertheless, if someone were to harm
such a child, no one would seriously contend that he should not be
considered a victim of a crime. Thus, it seems that, in cases such as these,
the defining characteristic of victimhood is sentience, not autonomy.
Nonetheless, this does not mean that there are never sound reasons
for legally discriminating between humans and animals. It could be
coherently argued, for example, that, in light of their unique capacity for
autonomy, humans should never be considered the property of anyone else.
However, since animals presumably don’t understand or care about notions
of ownership, their interests in not being considered property are arguably
62

See, generally, Professor Markus Dubber’s conception of victimhood. He considers
personhood to be a necessary condition for victimhood. Dubber, supra note 20.
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weaker than interests humans have with regards to the same issue.
Some scholars, like Gary Francione, argue that there is such a thing as
“animal autonomy” that should be considered worthy of legal protection. 64
If this were the case, the reasons for discriminating between animals and
humans, at least with regards to questions about the legitimacy of owning
such beings, disappear. However, one need not agree with this proposition
in order to defend the notion that animals should qualify as victims. For this
limited purpose, their capacity to feel pain appears to suffice.
2. THE CASE AGAINST CONCEIVING ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES AS A MEANS
OF PREVENTING HARM TO ANIMALS
The conception that anti-cruelty statutes are enacted as a way of
protecting animals against the unjustifiable infliction of pain appears to
conflict with certain features of these laws. Particularly difficult to explain
under this view is the fact that it is not a punishable crime to harm an
animal during the course of fishing or hunting activities. If it is really the
case that these statutes aim to prevent harm to animals, what superior
interest might justify harming them during the course of fishing or hunting
activities?
While it may be argued that the economic and entertainment
interests that are furthered by these activities justify harming the animals,
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Id.
Steven M. Wise, Drawing the Line: Science and the case for animal rights 4345(2002).
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many will find these reasons for engaging in the conduct unsatisfying.
However, it would be mistaken to conclude that, in light of these
considerations, the purpose of animal cruelty statutes is not to protect
animals. It might be argued that although these laws do in fact protect
animals, they assign too much weight to countervailing interests that might
justify an infraction of the prohibition. Thus, the problem doesn’t lie with
the purpose of the statute, which is by and large a salutary one, but with the
scope of the reasons that might justify what would otherwise constitute a
nominal infraction of the law. In order to fully understand this argument, a
discussion of the structure of criminal offenses generally and of anti cruelty
statutes in particular is warranted.
IV. ACTIVITIES HARMFUL TO ANIMALS EXEMPTED FROM PUNISHMENT AND
THE STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES
A. THE CLAIM
Animal law scholars frequently claim that the fact that anti cruelty
statutes are riddled with exceptions that allow people to harm animals
demonstrates that these statutes are enacted to ensure that humans continue
to exploit such creatures rather than to protect them. 65 Acceptance of this
proposition typically leads to odd intepretations of animal cruelty laws.
Take, for example, the views espoused by Professor Taimie Bryant in a
recent article. In discussing the way in which the criminal law deals with

Why is it a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish?

51

cases involving harm caused to egg-laying chickens, she stated that:
[T]he law does not identify as “cruel” the practices that directly
cause their suffering. If the suffering of these hens is deemed
“necessary” for the eggs they supply to humans, then that suffering
simply doesn't count in legal terms, nor does the suffering of the
humans who care about that suffering.” 66

This reading misapprehends the conceptual structure of criminal
offenses by confusing the inculpatory (whether the suffering of the hens
“counts” as legally relevant harm) and exculpatory (whether there are
reasons that justify the infliction of legally relevant suffering) dimensions of
animal cruelty statutes. This, in turn, leads to a failure to grasp the
communicative meaning of the exceptions that plague the laws prohibiting
animal abuse.
In the remainder of this section I will explore the structure of punishable
crimes in an attempt to both substantiate my contention that the
aforementioned reading of animal cruelty offenses is miguided and to
demonstrate why it is not true that the exceptions that plague these laws
reveal that they are primarily enacted to further human wellbeing rather
than to protect animals from unjustifiable harm.
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See, for example, GARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN
OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 131-132 (1996).
66

WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY

Taimie L. Bryant, Trauma, Law and Advocacy for Animals, 1 Journal of Animal
Law and Ethics 63, 76 (2006) (emphasis added).
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B. A PRIMER ON THE CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES

1. THE INCULPATORY VS. EXCULPATORY DIMENSION OF PUNISHABLE CRIMES
AND THE OFFENSE/JUSTIFICATION DISTINCTION
Punishable crimes have both an inculpatory and an exculpatory
dimension. 67 A person that engages in conduct that satisfies the elements of
an offense inculpates himself. 68 Thus, David incriminates himself if he kills
a human being (i.e. satisfies the elements of the offense of homicide).
Furthermore, a person who has performed an act that satisfies the elements
of an offense has engaged in conduct that is prima facie wrongful.
Consequently, David’s act of killing a human being is, all things being
equal (i.e. prima facie), unlawful. 69
This, of course, does not mean that conduct that satisfies the elements of
an offense is necessarily wrongful. An actor may escape liability despite
having inculpated himself by infringing the elements of an offense if he can
succesfully plead a justification defense. 70 Therefore, if David can
demonstrate that he acted in justifiable self-defense, he will not be punished
even though he engaged in conduct that was prima facie wrongful. The
presence of justificatory conditions such as self-defense or necessity
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See, for example, FLETCHER, supra note 40, at 562.
Id.
69
See my Normative Gaps, supra note 38, at 117-118.
70
An actor can also avoid liability by pleading an excuse defense such as insanity.
68
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transforms the actor’s prima facie wrongful act into conduct that is, all
things being considered, not wrongful. 71
It should be noted that conduct may be considered lawful either because
it does not inculpate the actor (i.e. does not satisfy the elements of an
offense) or because it should be exculpated in light of the presence of
circumstances which provide the actor with reasons for engaging in the
prima facie wrongful act (i.e. the actor has a “justification defense”). It
would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the actor’s acquittal in both
of these instances means the same thing. As I will demonstrate in the next
sub-section, there is a crucial difference between conduct that is not
wrongful because it does not satisfy the elements of an offense and conduct
that is lawful because it is justified. This distinction proves to be crucial to a
proper analysis of the structure and meaning of anti-cruelty offenses.

2. THE COMMUNICATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OFFENSE/JUSTIFICATION
DISTINCTION
a. HARMFUL VS. NON-HARMFUL LEGAL CONDUCT
The

communicative

significance

of

the

offense/justification

distinction can be illustrated by examining the difference between the acts
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Albin Eser, Justification and Excuse: A Key Issue in the Concept of Crime, in I
Justification and Excuse: Comparative Perspectives 17, 37 (George P. Fletcher & Albin
Eser eds., 1987).
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of shooting at a piece of paper and shooting at a person in self-defense. 72
The act of shooting at a piece of paper is lawful because it does not satisfy
the elements of an offense made criminal by our laws. Since this conduct is
not prohibited, engaging in it does not cause harm to an interest protected
by law. Thus, the act of shooting at a piece of paper, like any other conduct
that does not satisfy the elements of an offense, is irrelevant for the criminal
law.
Shooting at a human being in self-defense is also lawful. However,
in contrast with the act of shooting at a piece of paper, this type of conduct
does satisfy the elements of an offense: assault.73 Given that this conduct is
prohibited, performing it interferes with an interest that is otherwise
protected by the law – physical integrity. Obviously, the injury caused to
the person who was shot “counts” as harm as far as the law is concerned.
Therefore, the act of shooting at a person, is relevant for the criminal law
even though it is not wrongful because of the presence of justificatory
circumstances (i.e. self-defense).
As one can see, these acts are lawful due to very distinct reasons.
The act of shooting at a piece of paper does not satisfy the elements of an
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This is a variation of an example proposed by one of the greatest German criminal
law scholars of the 20th Century- Hans Welzel - as a way to illustrate the
offense/justification distinction in HANS WELZEL, DERECHO PENAL ALEMÁN 97-98 (Juan
Bustos Ramírez & Sergio Yáñez Pérez trans., 4th ed., 1997).
73
This, of course, assumes that the person did not die as a result of the conduct. If he
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offense. This type of conduct does not cause harm to an interest that the law
seeks to protect. Hence, the law does not provide us with reasons to abstain
from engaging in the act. Contrarily, the act of shooting at a person in selfdefense satisfies the elements of the offense of assault and injures one of the
most important interests protected by the criminal law. Since this type of
conduct is harmful, the law provides us with sound reasons to not engage in
the act (protecting life or physical integrity), even if doing so would be
justified.
b. REASONS AND THE OFFENSE/JUSTIFICATION DISTINCTION
Another way of making sense of the offense/justification distinction
is by examining the different manner in which these categories seek to mold
human conduct. By criminalizing offenses, we aim to provide people with
reasons against engaging in the prohibited course of action. 74 Take, for
example, the offense of arson. When we prohibit the act of setting property
of another on fire without his consent, we are providing the citizenry with a
sound reason against engaging in this type of conduct. Thus, if Randy were
to ask Ralph whether he should burn down Sasha’s corn field, Ralph could
coherently point to the fact that doing so would satisfy the elements of a
criminal offense as a sound reason for Randy not to engage in the conduct.

had died, then the act would satisfy the elements of the offense of homicide.
74
Gardner, supra note 9, at 822 (stating that prohibitory norms provide us with reasons
“not to peform the prohibitory act” and, by way of example, that the “norm that prohibits
promise-breaking…is [among other things] a reason not to break promises”).
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Contrarily, the law provides no reasons against engaging in conduct that

is not constitutive of an offense. Thus, the law provides no reasons that can
be advanced against Sasha’s decision to burn down his own corn field in
order to build a barn, for this conduct does not satisfy the elements of an
offense. 75 Although people might have myriad grounds for opposing
Sasha’s decision to burn down his corn field, they cannot claim that such
grounds make Sasha’s decision to perform the conduct illegal.
Justifications, on the other hand, do not provide us with reasons to
abstain from performing a given act. When we recognize the existence of a
justification, we aim to provide people with sound reasons in favor of
engaging in conduct that does satisfy the elements of an offense. Hence,
justifications provide us with “legally admissible reason[s] in favour of
[acting in] nonconformity with the norm”. 76
Suppose, for example, that Randy now asked Ralph whether he could
burn down Sasha’s corn field in order to create a firebreak that will prevent
three homes from being engulfed by flames. This time, Ralph could respond
by stating that the existence of justificatory circumstances (necessity/choice
of evils) provide Randy with sound reasons to burn down the corn field,
even if engaging in such conduct infringes the elements of the offense of

75

The conduct does not satisfy neither the elements of the offense of arson nor
criminal mischief, for both of these offenses require that the property that is destroyed
(criminal mischief) or set in fire (arson) belong to another.
76
Gardner, supra note 9, at 822.

Why is it a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish?

57

arson.
It should be noted, however, that the fact that justifications provide us
with good reasons for engaging in the conduct does not mean that the
reasons that the offense provides against performing the conduct magically
disappear. 77 Thus, it has been stated that:
When someone pleads a justification, she is claiming that the reasons in
favour of doing as she did stand undefeated by the reasons against. The
reasons against are those that make what she did an offence. They have
not gone away. They still make it an offence. But the reasons in
favour prevail and make it a justified offence (and hence one of which
she should be acquitted) 78

Since the reasons that the offense provides for abstaining to engage in
the act are not swept away by the existence of justificatory circumstances,
some “residual” reasons for not performing the conduct remain even if the
act is ultimately justified. Consequently, although necessity provides Randy
with good reasons for burning down Sasha’s corn field, the fact that doing
so infringes the elements of the offense of arson still provides us with some
residual reasons against performing the justified conduct. However, given
that these residual reasons (saving the corn field) are not of sufficient force
to outweigh the reasons in favor of engaging in the conduct that the
existence of justificatory circumstances provide (saving three homes),
burning down Sasha’s corn field in such a case cannot be considered
77

Kenneth Campbell, Offence and Defence, in Criminal Law and Justice: Essays from
the W.G. Hart Workshop, 1986, at 83 (I.H. Dennis ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1987).
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criminal.

c. REGRETTABLE VS. NON-REGRETTABLE LAWFUL ACTS
While the existence of residual reasons against performing an act that is
constitutive of an offense does not afford us with sufficient grounds to
criminalize the conduct if it is justified, they do provide us with sound
reasons to feel regret for having engaged in the conduct. We have cause to
regret the conduct because, all things being considered, “[i]t would have
been better still had there been no occasion to commit [the act], and hence
no need to ask whether its commission was justified or not.” 79 Therefore,
justified conduct, although lawful, is regrettable, for the harm that the
infraction of the elements of the offense represents is not wiped away
merely by the existence of justificatory circumstances.
In a recent article, Professors Michelle Dempsey and Jonathan Herring
convincingly argued both that instances of “justified prima facie
wrongdoing leav[e] a moral residue of regret” and that the regret thus
produced has significant “rational force”. 80 This regret has rational force
because it generates legal reasons “to prefer less wrongful alternatives to
securing the values that justify the prima facie wrongful conduct”. 81
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Gardner, supra. Note 9, at 822.
Id.
80
Michelle Madden Dempsey & Jonathan Herring, Why Sexual Penetration Requires
Justification, 27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 467, 488 (2007).
81
Id.
79
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Suppose, for example, that the law does not impose a duty to retreat as a
prerequisite to the use of justifiable force in self-defense. Thus, according to
the law in this jurisdiction, Sandra could justifiably kill Laura in order to
repel her unlawful deadly attack, even if she could have avoided injury by
retreating to a safe place. However, since the act of killing Laura satisfies
the elements of the offense of homicide, Sandra has good reasons (saving
Laura’s life) for abstaining to engage in the justifiable conduct. Although
the reasons against engaging in the conduct that the offense represents are
not of sufficient weight to make Sandra’s justifiable use of deadly force
criminal, they do provide her with motives to regret killing Laura.
Furthermore, these residual “regret-causing motives” afford Sandra with
reasons to attempt to avert the unlawful attack by retreating, although it
would not be criminal for her to decide to repel the attack by killing Laura
in self-defense. Curiously, the same reasons that the offense provides us
against killing Laura in self-defense in the first place – the protection of
human life - are the reasons that counsel in favor of attempting to avert the
attack by less harmful alternatives. 82

82

Dempsey and Herring illustrate the rational force of regret by way of the following
example:
Surgical cutting into a patient's body is a prima facie wrong, but one that may be
justified in virtue of reasons generated inter alia by the value of the patient's life and
well-being. Despite its justification, however, cutting into a patient's body is still to be
regretted. This regret generates reasons for medical personnel to seek less wrongful
alternatives to securing the values sought by the surgery. If, for example, the purpose

60

Why is it a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish?
Contrarily, acts that do not satisfy the elements of an offense do not

generate reasons to regret having engaged in the conduct. As a result, a
person who engages in conduct that does not constitute an offense has no
reasons for seeking less injurious alternatives for achieving whatever it is
that he aims to attain by performing the act. Therefore, the law does not
afford someone who shoots at a piece of paper reasons to feel regret for
having engaged in the conduct. This, in turn, entails that there is no reason
for a person to attempt to make use of other less harmful means in order to
achieve whatever it is that they aim to accomplish by shooting at the piece
of paper (target practice, for example).

3. THE SUPRA-STATUTORY NATURE OF THE OFFENSE/JUSTIFICATION
DISTINCTION
On some occasions, the positive law clearly distinguishes between
offenses and justifications. This is typically the case with regards to the
conduct that is regulated in the comprehensive penal codes of most
jurisdictions. Usually, criminal codes are divided into a “special part” and a
“general part”. The special part contains the offenses whose commission is
regarded as prima facie wrongful. The general part, on the other hand,

of the cutting is to perform exploratory surgery in hopes of diagnosing a source of the
patient's abdominal pain, it is rationally incumbent upon the surgeon to seek less
wrongful alternatives to diagnosing the source of the pain before cutting into the
patient's body.
Id., at 488-489.
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contains a series of general doctrines of criminal responsibility that, in
principle, apply to every instance of commission of an offense. 83 It is here
where one can typically find provisions that deal with the exculpatory
dimension of criminal offenses and, consequently, with justification
defenses.
Since the special part of penal codes contains a long list of offenses and
the general part usually contains a catalogue of justification defenses (selfdefense, necessity, law enforcement duties, etc), the offense/justification
distinction is often clearly reflected in the statutory law of any given
jurisdiction. The New York Penal Law, for example, distinguishes between
“general provisions” (i.e. the “general part”) and “specific offenses” (i.e. the
“special part”). 84 Thus, the list of acts that are deemed to be prima facie
illegal are regulated in the “specific offenses” part of the Penal Law,
whereas the justificatory circumstances that allow us to engage in what
would otherwise constitute an unlawful act are specified in the “general
provisions” section of the statute. Such an organizational structure of penal
laws typically makes it easier for us to differentiate between offenses and
justifications. An examination of New York law reveals, for example, that

83

Thus, the general part of many criminal codes contain provisions with regards to
basic doctrines of criminal law, such as the “act requirement”, the forms of culpability (i.e.
intent and negligence), attempt liability, perpetration and complicity, etc. See, generally,
FLETCHER, supra note 40, at 393-395.
84
New York Penal Law contains an additional part (Part II) that is intended to regulate
sentencing practices.
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whoever kills a human being in self-defense has committed the offense of
homicide. 85 Given that this conduct is constitutive of an offense, we have
sound reasons against engaging in the act. In spite of this, the use of force in
self-defense is not criminal pursuant to New York law because it is
justified. 86 Thus, although the fact that such conduct infringes the elements
of an offense provides us with reasons to abstain from engaging in the act,
the existence of justificatory circumstances would make such conduct one
that is, on balance, not wrongful.
Unfortunately, legislative appearances can sometimes be deceiving, for
criminal statutes do not always differentiate in a clear way between conduct
that is not wrongful because it does not satisfy the elements of an offense
and acts that are legal because they are justified. The California Penal Code
provision defining the crime of murder constitutes a chief example.
According to the Code, murder is “the unlawful killing of a human
being…with

malice

aforethought”. 87

What

makes

this

provision

problematic is that it infelicitously conflates the inculpatory and exculpatory
dimensions of the crime by specifying that murder is an “unlawful killing”.
Since justified killings are, by definition, lawful, it follows that deaths that
are produced as a result of the justifiable use of force do not satisfy
California’s definition of murder. Thus, at first glance, one might be
85
86

§125.00 N.Y. Penal Law.
§35.15 N.Y. Penal Law.
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tempted to conclude that, at least in California, causing the death of a
person in self-defense is lawful because it does not satisfy the elements of
an offense. Therefore, it might be argued that a person who kills another in
self-defense has committed no prima-facie wrong that is in need of
justification. 88
Although seductive, this understanding of the offense/justification
distinction is either wrong or profoundly unilluminating. If the distinction is
to be of any consequence, “offenses” and “justifications” ought to be
understood as conceptual categories that help us to better appreciate the
general structure of punishable crimes, not as labels that can be legislatively
defined in such a way that distinguishing between these categories would be
a worthless endeavor. The reason why I have paid so much attention to the
offense/justification dichotomy in this article is because I believe that we
can learn something about the law, morality and society by understanding
the distinction. Thus, by making use of the terms “offense” and
“justification”, I am making broad claims about the nature and structure of
punishable crimes in our society, not about the particular way in which the

87

§187 Cal. Penal Code.
According to this reading, justifications (i.e. self-defense) would constitute negative
elements of the offense, rather than independent defenses that exclude the wrongfulness of
the conduct without negating the elements of the offense. Some European scholars
maintain that this is the best way to interpret criminal statutes. See, for example, DIEGO
MANUEL LUZÓN PEÑA, CURSO DE DERECHO PENAL PARTE GENERAL 302-303 (Universitas,
1996). This position, however, has been convincingly criticized by numerous scholars. See,
generally, FRANCISCO MUÑOZ CONDE & MERCEDES GARCÍA ARÁN, DERECHO PENAL
PARTE GENERAL 252-253 (Tirant Lo Blanch, 2004).
88
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legislature of California (sloppily) drafted their murder statute (or any other
criminal statute).
Therefore, it is clear that the offense/justification distinction that I am
referring to is supra-statutory in nature. According to this understanding of
the distinction, which is widely shared by criminal theorists and legal
philosophers, the way in which a statute has been drafted is not
determinative when ascertaining whether conduct should be considered
lawful because it is not constitutive of an “offense” or because it is
“justified”. 89
Since the statutory formulations of crimes can sometimes be misleading,
it is necessary to elaborate supra-statutory standards that allow us to
distinguish between conduct that is lawful because it does not satisfy the
elements of an offense and conduct that is lawful because it is justified. In
my opinion, this can be accomplished by appealing to the ideas that
undergird the different ways of understanding the offense/justification
distinction that have been elaborated in this section.
Previously, I attempted to demonstrate the communicative significance
of the “offense” and “justification” categories by appealing to three

89

This view was forcefully defended by the leading German criminal theorist Hans
Welzel, who stated that whether the legislature decides to incorporate the criteria of
justification into the definition of a crime is “irrelevant” to distinguishing between the
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different notions – harmful vs. non-harmful lawful acts, reasons against and
reasons in favor of perfoming an act, and regrettable vs. non-regrettable
lawful conduct. I believe that these notions can also serve as heuristic
devices that aid us in the sometimes difficult endeavor of distinguishing
between offenses and justifications, particularly when the statutory law does
not provide much guidance.
Thus, regardless of how the legislature decides to draft their criminal
statutes, a promising way of distinguishing between different types of nonwrongful acts is by asking ourselves the following questions:
(1) The conduct is lawful because: (a) no harm has been caused,
or (b) although harm has been caused, the benefits caused
by the act outweigh the harm produced by the conduct.
(2) The conduct is lawful because: (a) we have no reasons to
refrain from performing it, or (b) although there are reasons
against engaging in the conduct, they are outweighed by
reasons in favor of performing the act.
(3) Do we have reasons to attempt to make use of other less
harmful means in order to achieve what we aimed to
accomplish by engaging in the lawful act? (a) no, because
there are no reasons to regret having engaged in the act, or
(b) yes, because there are reasons to regret having engaged in
the act.
If the answer to the three questions is (a), then the conduct is lawful
because it does not satisfy the elements of an offense. Contrarily, if the
answer to these questions is (b), then the conduct is legal because it is

offense”). Id.
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justified.
These questions provide us guidance when determining whether a
killing in self-defense is not wrongful because it doesn’t satisfy the
elements of an offense or because it is justified. As was previously stated,
the California murder provision suggests that such killings are lawful
because they do not satisfy the elements of an offense. This conclusion,
however, is mistaken, given that:
(1) The conduct is lawful because, although harm has been caused
(death of the aggressor), the evil wreaked by the act is outweighed
by the evil avoided by the conduct (death of person unlawfully
attacked).
(2) The conduct is lawful because, although there are reasons against
engaging in the conduct (protecting the life of the aggressor), they
are outweighed by reasons in favor of performing the act (protecting
the life of the person attacked).
(3) We have legal reasons to attempt to make use of other less harmful
means in order to achieve what we aimed to accomplish by killing
the aggressor in self-defense (by retreating, for example), because
there are reasons to regret having killed the aggressor.

C. THE STRUCTURE OF ANTI-CRUELTY OFFENSES
1. THE AMBIGUITY OF ANIMAL CRUELTY LAWS
Now that we have explored the general structure of punishable crimes,
we are in a better position to understand the particular structure of anticruelty statutes. Anti cruelty laws, like other criminal statutes, have an
inculpatory and exulpatory dimension. Thus, a reading of these laws reveals
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that they purport to both describe conduct that society considers to be prima
facie wrongful and to illustrate circumstances in which engaging in such
conduct is, all things being considered, non-wrongful. In other words, anticruelty statutes contain both definitions of offenses and a catalogue of
justifications. The problem, as anyone who has read up to this point would
suspect, is that these laws do not clearly differentiate between conduct that
is not wrongful because it doesn’t satisfy the elements of the offense and
acts that are lawful because they are justified.
Take, for example, the Montana anti-cruelty statute. This law
criminalizes a variety of acts, such as “injuring” or “killing” an animal. 90
However, it also states that “nothing in this section prohibits [injuring or
killing

an

animal

as

result

of]

commonly

accepted

agricultural…practices”. 91 The combined effect of these two provisions is
unclear. There are a couple of plausible interpretations of this statute:
(1)

Injuring or killing an animal as a result of lawful agricultural
practices is not prohibited (i.e. is “lawful”) because doing so
does not satisfy the elements of an offense, or

(2)

Injuring or killing an animal as a result of lawful agricultural
practices is not prohibited because, although doing so satisfies
the elements of an offense, it is justified.

The Texas anti-cruelty statute is plagued by a similar ambiguity.
Pursuant to said law, intentionally “killing”, “torturing” or “seriously
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injuring” an animal is a crime. 92 However, “it is a defense to
prosecution…that the actor [harmed the animal as a result of being]
engaged in bona fide…scientific research”. 93 Once again, there are two
possible interpretations of this statute:
(1)

Injuring or killing an animal as a result of bona fide scientific
experimentation is not prohibited because doing so does not
satisfy the elements of an offense, or

(2)

Injuring or killing an animal as a result of bona fide scientific
experimentation is not prohibited because doing so is justified.

How should we determine which of the plausible readings of the Texas and
Montana 94 statutes represents the best interpretation of animal cruelty
laws? 95
One possible way to tackle this matter would be to look for answers by
parsing the statutory text. Some might believe, for example, that the fact
that the Texas statute states that “it is a defense” to prosecution that the
harm was caused as a result of scientific experimentation implies that this
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type of conduct is justified, for justifications are defenses to crimes.
Furtheremore, it might be argued that since the Montana statute asserts that
“nothing in this section prohibits” injuring animals as a result of agricultural
practices, engaging in such conduct does not even satisfy the elements of
the offense.
This type of analysis strikes me as formalistic and unenlightening. It is
clear that these statutes purport to exclude certain activities that are harmful
to animals (scientific experiments and agricultural practices) from the reach
of the criminal law. I do not believe, however, that much should be read
into the specific way in which legislatures have drafted such exceptions.
Whether the statute declares the lawfulness of such conduct by asserting
that it “is a defense to the crime” or by claiming that the act is “not
prohibited” by the law is immaterial to the question about whether the
legality of the conduct stems from the fact that it is not constitutive of an
offense or from its justifiable nature.
Since the offense/justification distinction is supra-statutory in nature, I
believe that a more satisfying an answer to the aforementioned question can
be obtained by appealing to the heuristic devices that I have described in the
previous sub-section. It is to this matter that I now turn.
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2. HARM, REASONS AND REGRET IN ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES
a. HARMFUL LEGAL ACTS AND ANTI-CUELTY STATUTES
By now it should be clear that there is a difference between non-harmful

and harmful legal acts. Conduct that does not satisfy the elements of an
offense does not typically cause harm (i.e. shooting at a piece of paper).
However, justified conduct usually causes harm, although the harm avoided
by engaging in the act is greater than the one inflicted (shooting at a person
in self-defense). Thus, the first question that one should ask when
examining the nature of the exemption of punishment that is afforded to
those who injure animals pursuant to scientific or agricultural practices is
whether those acts are lawful because they do not cause harm or because the
harm that they inflict is outweighed by the benefits that are reaped by
engaging in the conduct. The following examples might help us to answer
this question.
(1)

Judy decides to dislocate a rabbit’s neck because she enjoys
seeing animals suffer.

(2)

Judy decides to dislocate a a rabbit’s neck pursuant to a bona
fide scientific experiment.

(3)

Judy decides to dislocate a rabbit’s neck in order to slaughter the
creature and sell it in a commercial establishment pursuant to
local laws.

The conduct in example number (1) is clearly criminal under most, if
not all, modern anti-cruelty statutes. Thus, the harm that is caused to the
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rabbit is most certainly relevant for the criminal law. The conduct in
example (2), on the other hand, is undoubtedly lawful under the traditional
animal cruelty statute. It would be mistaken, however, to believe that the
legality of such conduct stems from the fact that the harm caused to the
rabbit is legally irrelevant. As example (1) demonstrates, the infliction of
harm to rabbits matters for the criminal law. It would thus be odd to assume
that the fact that the rabbit is injured pursuant to a bona fide scientific
acticvity magically erases the harm caused to the creature.
Consequently, it makes better sense to conclude that the exemption from
punishment afforded in example (2) is the product of a determination that
the conduct is lawful because the harm endured by the animal is outweighed
by the potential benefits of engaging in the scientific experimentation. Of
course, one might disagree with the relative value that the law assigns to the
interests in conflict in such cases. Many, including myself, believe that the
harm caused to the rabbit should be given much more weight than what is
currently the case. However, this disagreement does not prove that the
injury caused to the rabbit in such cases does not “count” as harm for the
criminal law. It merely demonstrates that such harm does not “count” as
much as I, and most animal law scholars, believe that it should.
The conduct in example (3) should be treated in much the same way as
the act in example (2). There is nothing magical about food production that
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makes the harm caused to the rabbit in example (3) any different from the
harm caused to the animal in example (1). The harm caused in both cases is
identical: the dislocation of a rabbit’s neck. The infliction of this harm, qua
harm, remains unwelcome. However, the conduct in example (3) is lawful
because the benefits generated by the act (production of food) is deemed to
outweigh the harm caused to the animal.
An examination of these hypotheticals reveals that the reason why
injuring an animal pursuant to agricultural or scientific acitivities is lawful
is not because doing so does not constitute an offense, for such acts harm an
interest protected by the criminal law. These acts are legal because they are
justified, for, even though the harm that they cause matters for the criminal
law, it is (rightly or wrongly) outweighed by countervailing considerations.
b. “REASONS” AND ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES
Another way of probing the structure of animal cruelty statutes is by
examining whether those that harm animals pursuant to certain enumerated
activities act lawfully because there are no reasons for prohibiting such
conduct or because, despite there being reasons against performing such
acts, they are counterbalanced by the reasons that we have in favor of
engaging in the conduct. If the former explanation for the lawfulness of the
conduct is accurate (there are no reasons against performing the act), then it
should be concluded that the causation of harm to animals as a result of
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scientific or agricultural activities is not constitutive of an offense.
However, if the latter explanation for the non-wrongfulness of the conduct
is correct (reasons in favor of performing the act outweigh reasons against),
then engaging in such acts is lawful because it is justified. An examination
of the examples put forth in the previous sub-section is once again useful to
a discussion of these matters.
I believe that example (1) demonstrates that animal cruelty statutes
provide us with reasons against injuring animals. If Judy were to ask Andy
whether she should dislocate a rabbit’s neck, Andy would be able to point
out that anti cruelty statutes give her good reasons to abstain from doing so.
In other words, such statutes provide us with prima facie reasons against
injuring an animal. On the other hand, examples (2) and (3) show that
animal cruelty statutes also provide us with reasons in favor of harming
animals (scientific experiments and food production) that might outweigh
the prima facie reasons that the law affords against engaging in such
conduct (keeping animals free from harm).
It should be noted, however, that it invites confusion to state that the
presence of reasons in favor of performing the conduct wipe away the
reasons against engaging in the act. Asserting that the law provides no
reasons against dislocating a rabbit’s neck if such harm takes place as a
result of scientific experimentation or food processing practices would be
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misleading. It makes better sense to conclude that, despite the fact that we
have good reasons not to dislocate a rabbit’s neck, those reasons are
outweighed if the injuries occur pursuant to certain lawful activities.
These reflections corroborate that engaging in conduct that falls within
the purview of the exceptions that plague anti-cruelty statutes is lawful
because it is justified, not because it is not constitutive of an offense.
Consequently, although the law affords Judy with valid grounds to injure an
animal pursuant to scientific or food processing activities, the fact that
doing so is constitutive of an offense still provides her with residual reasons
against performing the justified conduct. However, given that these residual
reasons (keeping the animal free from harm) are not of sufficient weight to
counterbalance the reasons in favor of engaging in the act that the presence
of justificatory circumstances provide (scientific advancement, food
processing), dislocating the rabbit’s neck is considered legal in such
circumstances.
c. REGRET AND ANTI-CRUELTY STATUTES
The residual reasons that remain against harming an animal even in
circumstances when doing so would be justified pursuant to some lawful
activity provide us with sufficient motives to regret having had to cause the
harm, even if doing so was justifiable. The rational force of such regret
should lead us to seek other less harmful alternatives to achieving the ends
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that we aimed to accomplish by injuring the animal.
Thus, Judy should first attempt to obtain whatever knowledge she
wishes to attain by injuring the rabbit by engaging in scientific experiments
that do not involve harm to animals. I think that this belief is shared by most
people. Even if the majority of the population believes that it is justifiable to
harm animals in order to advance science, many people are disturbed by the
suffering that such activities cause to animals. The bulk of the populace
regrets the harm that is inflicted to these animals and would thus prefer that,
if possible, other less injurious alternatives be used in order to achieve
scientific advancement.

Similarly, we have reason to regret harming

animals pursuant to food processing activities. As a result, most people
would probably prefer that those in charge of engaging in such activities
seek the least harmful methods to achieve the desired end.
The fact that we have good reason to regret harming animals
pursuant to scientific and agricultural activities buttresses the conclusion
that engaging in such conduct is lawful because it is justified, not because it
does not satisfy the elements of an offense. As I have stated before, conduct
that is lawful because it does not satisfy the elements of an offense
(shooting at a piece of paper) is typically not regrettable. However, conduct
that is lawful because it is justified (shooting a person in self-defense) is
generally regrettable. Thus, it makes more sense to conclude that injuring an
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animal in order to advance scientific knowledge or to produce food has
more in common with the act of shooting at a person in self-defense than
with the act of shooting at a piece of paper.
As has been demonstrated, both the acts of harming an animal pursuant
to one of these activities and of shooting a person in self-defense inflict
harm that is relevant for the criminal law. Furthermore, they are lawful
because the reasons in favor of engaging in the act outweigh the reasons
against performing the conduct, not because there are no reasons to abstain
from engaging in the act in the first place. As a result, we have reason to
regret both harming animals and shooting at human beings, even if doing so
would be justifiable. This, in turn, generates reasons that should lead us to
seek less injurious alternatives to attain the end that we would accomplish
by engaging in the justified conduct.
The following table summarizes the conclusions that have been
advanced up to this point:
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Table 1. The Structure and Communicative Meaning of Anti-Cruelty
Statutes
The
Categories
The Offense

The
Justifications

The Act-Descrpition

The Communicative Significance

Causing injury to a
non-human animal

A person who infringes the offense
has:
1. harmed an interest that the
criminal law seeks to protect
2. performed conduct that is, all
things being equal, wrongful
3. engaged in conduct that we have
reasons to refrain from performing
4. performed conduct that we have
reason to regret
A person who justifiably infringes
the offense has:
1. harmed an interest that the
criminal law seeks to protect, but
the harmed caused is outweighed
by the benefits generated by the
conduct,
2. performed conduct that is, all
things being considered, not
wrongful,
3. reasons for engaging in the
conduct that outweigh the reasons
against performing the act,
4. performed lawful conduct that
we nevertheless have reason to
regret

1. Bona fide
Scientific
Experimentation,
2. Farming,
Agricultural and
Food Processing
Practices,
3. Hunting, Fishing,
and Trapping
Practices
4. Pest Control,
5. Others.

D. WHY THE ANIMAL LAW SCHOLAR’S CLAIM IS WRONG
An understanding of the conceptual structure of anti-cruelty offenses
reveals that the interpretation of such laws typically afforded by animal law
scholars is misguided. Once one differentiates between the inculpatory (the
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offense) and exculpatory (the justifications) dimensions of these laws, one
can see why it is not true that, as Professor Bryant has argued, the harm
caused to animals as a result of the activities that are exempted from
punishment under the typical anti-cruelty statute “simply doesn't count in
legal terms”.
As has been argued, acts that are considered lawful pursuant to one of
these exemptions remain harmful even though they are justified. It is thus
mistaken to conclude that the harm inflicted to animals pursuant to
justifiable activities does not “count” as legally relevant harm.

The

presence of justificatory circumstances (advancement of agricultural or
scientific activities) does not wipe away the harm caused by the conduct.
What these exemptions truly reveal is that there are countervailing reasons
that society considers to be of sufficient weight to justify engaging in prima
facie wrongful conduct that causes harm to animals, not that the offense was
not designed to protect animals in the first place. Therefore, the thesis
advanced in this article – that the chief reason why we create anti-cruelty
offenses is to protect animals from the infliction of harm – is not
incompatible with the exemptions contemplated in the typical animal
cruelty statute.
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E. WHY ALL OF THIS SHOULD MATTER TO AN ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTIVIST
Up to this point, I have attempted to demonstrate that the interpretation
that many animal law scholars have made of the exemptions that plague anti
cruelty statutes is misguided because it conflates the inculpatory and
exculpatory dimensions of such laws. I will now (very) briefly sketch why
such an interpretation is also objectionable on pragmatic grounds.
The reading of anti cruelty statutes that I have criticized here is probably
the product of the fundamental disagreement that many animal law scholars
have with the myriad reasons that such laws provide as justifications for
infringing the offense. For them, the fact that the exemptions that plague
these statutes leaves an inordinate number of acts that are harmful to
animals unpunished demonstrates that the real purpose of these laws is to
protect human activities that cannot be accomplished without injuring
animals.
Although I am also outraged by many of the justifications that these
statutes provide for inflicting harm to animals, I believe that those who
defend the position that I have attempted to debunk here have failed to
understand what seems intuitively obvious to most people – that society has
called for the creation of anti-cruelty offenses as a way of protecting
animals, not as a vehicle for perpetuating the exploitation of such
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creatures. 96 In my opinion, it is a strategic blunder to ignore that, as Jerrold
Tannenbaum has correctly pointed out, people “virtually universally” accept
the proposition that “the primary purpose of [anti-cruelty] laws is to protect
animals” 97 Thus, instead of decrying statutes that criminalize animal abuse
as another example of how animals are treated as “fungible” and
“disposable” goods, 98 we should argue against the existence of the many
exemptions that plague such laws by tapping into the basic sentiment that
has led people to call for the enactment of anti-cruelty statutes in the first
place.
CONCLUSIONS
A. STATUTES CRIMINALIZING HARMFUL CONDUCT AGAINST ANIMALS DO
NOT PRIMARILY SEEK TO PROTECT PROPERTY INTERESTS
The conclusion that anti-cruelty statutes do not primarily seek to
further property interests will strike some as provocative. Many, if not most,
animal law scholars have accepted Professor Francione’s contention that “as
far as the law is concerned, animals are nothing more than commodities”. 99
Thus, the proposition that animals are for all relevant legal purposes treated
as property is generally accepted.
While this might very well be the case in the non-criminal context, it
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doesn’t ring true as far as the penal law is concerned. Although a propertybased conception of anti-cruelty statutes prevailed during much of the 19th
Century, since then there has been an irreversible trend towards
criminalizing animal abuse regardless of questions of property. Under
modern animal cruelty statutes, pet owners are generally not free to harm
their animals. Furthermore, they typically cannot consent to letting their
animals being harmed by someone else. These propositions are at odds with
a property-based conception of such laws.
Some believe that the only way of giving to animals the protection
that they deserve lies in changing their legal status from property to persons.
In an attempt to convince people that this shift in the juridical status of
animals is necessary, scholars have traditionally appealed to extra-legal
philosophical arguments. While these theoretical avenues are certainly
worth pursuing, I believe that the seeds of the “personhood” of animals can
already be found in modern animal cruelty laws. As far as anti-cruelty
statutes are concerned, animals are being treated like persons in a very
important way—they qualify as victims worthy of being protected by the
criminal laws irrespective of their property status in the non-criminal law
context.

99

Francione, supra note 45.
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B. HARM TO ANIMALS IS NOT CRIMINALIZED PRIMARILY AS A MEANS OF
ENFORCING MORALITY
A second conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing discussion is
that, although mistreating animals is certainly immoral, it should not be
contended that this is the principal reason for criminalizing the conduct. If
there is one thing that the venerable harm principle stands for, it is the fact
that an act should not be proscribed solely because it is deemed to be
contrary to a moral principle. This contention is both compatible with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence and with the position held by most
criminal law theorists.
C. CRIMINAL STATUTES THAT PROHIBIT HARM TO ANIMALS PRIMARILY
SEEK TO PROTECT ANIMALS FROM BEING HARMED
The view that animal cruelty statutes seek to prevent harm to animals is
both normatively appealing and descriptively illuminating. From a
normative viewpoint, conferring legal protection to non-human sentient
beings is a welcome development. If we can all agree that experiencing pain
is something worth avoiding and that non-human animals have the capacity
to be cognizant of such feelings, it follows that we should also protect them
from the unjustifiable infliction of suffering.
From a descriptive standpoint it is also preferable to conceive anticruelty statutes as laws that are designed to prevent harm to animals. Both
domestically and internationally, governments are banning activities that
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cause harm to animals despite the fact that their performance sometimes
commands considerable support from the populace. Thus, all state
jurisdictions in the United States have criminalized dog and cock fighting
over the objections of many. Similarly, bullfighting is banned in several
countries once associated with the Spanish crown despite its rich historical
roots. 100 These recent trends in anti-cruelty legislation are difficult to
explain unless one believes that the chief purpose of criminalizing animal
abuse is to prevent the unjustifiable suffering of animals. No alternative
conception of animal cruelty laws comes close to explaining this
increasingly important aspect of anti-cruelty legislation.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that anti-cruelty statutes were
enacted solely for the purpose of protecting animals from harm.
Undoubtedly, these laws, like many other criminal statutes (i.e. rape and
murder statutes), also exist in partial recognition of the fact that most people
consider that engaging in the prohibited conduct is morally reprehensible.
Furthermore, it is likely that the decision to criminalize cruelty to animals
was motivated to some extent by an interest in curbing future harm to
humans and in preventing emotional pain to those with close ties to the
creatures harmed. It might also be argued that some features of animal
cruelty laws promote the preservation of certain property interests.
100

Cuba.

In Latin America, bullfighting has been banned in Uruguay, Argentina, Chile and
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Nevertheless, I believe that the conclusion that the primary purpose of

animal cruelty statutes is to protect animals from harm is inescapable. This
conclusion is not contradicted by the fact that these laws contain
exemptions that allow for the causation of harm to animals pursuant to
certain lawful activities (scientific experimentation, agriculture, hunting,
etc). An examination of the structure of anti-cruelty statutes reveals that the
exempted activities promote interests that justify inflicting suffering on
animals, not that laws criminalizing animal abuse were not designed to
protect the creatures in the first place.
D. PEOPLE V GARCIA: A SECOND LOOK

Once it is understood that the principal purpose of anti-cruelty statutes
is to prevent injury to animals, one can see why the decision in People v.
Garcia cannot withstand close scrutiny. The court asked all of the wrong
questions because it seemed to conceive animal cruelty statutes as laws that
are designed either to prevent future harm to humans or to prevent
emotional harm to those with close ties to the animal abused. The former
conceptualization of animal cruelty statutes led the court to focus on the
state of mind of the perpetrator in order to determine whether his act
evinced a heightened level of cruelty. The latter characterization led the
court to focus on the emotional harm caused to the custodian of the pet.
By misapprehending the nature and purpose of anti-cruelty statutes, the
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court gave short thrift to the only being whose interests were sought to be
protected by such legislation –the animal harmed- in this case, Junior the
goldfish. Therefore, the question that should have been asked in Garcia is
whether the instantaneous killing of a goldfish by stomping on him
constitutes an act of simple or aggravated cruelty. The decisive
consideration should thus be the amount of pain and suffering endured by
the fish. As the amount of pain inflicted increases, the arguments in favor of
considering the act to be one of aggravated cruelty get stronger. Contrarily,
as the amount of pain and suffering decreases, the case in favor of a finding
of aggravated cruelty weakens.
Reasonable minds might disagree with regards to whether the suffering
endured by Junior was of such a degree to warrant a determination of
aggravated cruelty. On the one hand, the defendant’s contention that the fish
did not suffer because he was killed instantly seems to point in the direction
of not considering this act to be one of extreme cruelty. On the other hand,
it might be argued that the killing of a being constitutes the supreme act of
cruelty. If that were the case, a finding of aggravated cruelty would be
warranted.
Regardless of whether one believes that the defendant should have
prevailed in his arguments, there is little doubt with regards to who was the
real victim of the Court’s analysis in Garcia –a little goldfish named Junior.

